Could Mafia Governance be seen as Legitimate?

The Cosa Nostras, more commonly known as the Mafia, is widely regarded as one of the most infamous organised crime groups in history. While some sources trace their origins as far back as 1838 (Ulloa, 1961 p.233), their rise to power is more accurately attributed to the weakened governance of 19th-century Sicily. During this period, as feudalism transitioned to capitalism, the Mafia capitalised on economic and political instability, organising themselves to monopolise protection services. This extralegal form of governance became the foundation of their influence and continues to be a central focus for criminologists and anthropologists.

This case study will explore how the Cosa Nostra rose to prominence and instilled fear in Sicily, with an emphasis on their origins and foundational structures. The discussion will examine their organisation through the lens of criminal behavioural models, highlighting their evolution into what we now recognise as the Mafia. Additionally, key factors influencing their development will be analysed, including the shifting economic landscape, the role of the Bourbon monarchy, populist uprisings, and the abolition of primogeniture.

Furthermore, a significant part of this study will engage with the functionalist approach to Mafia governance, where much of the existing literature situates itself, drawing on theories of criminal governance proposed by scholars such as Bandiera, Lessing, Pavlov, and Olson. These perspectives often argue that while the Mafia exerts governance-like functions, it should not be considered a legitimate form of governance. However, the latter half of this study will propose a more interdisciplinary argument: that Mafia governance can, in fact, be regarded as a legitimate form of governance. Using the case study of the Cosa Nostra in Sicily, I will argue that many behaviours commonly associated with the Mafia, parallel state-building initiatives. This analysis will incorporate literature on sub-type states, including Mafia and rebel governance models, which are increasingly recognised across disciplines as legitimate state forms. The discussion will also engage with the works of key theorists such as Charles Tilly and Max Weber, who conceptualised state-building and governance as more complex system than purely concrete.

Finally, this study will consider the contemporary relevance of these debates, examining how neoliberalism has transformed governance globally. By drawing parallels between business network models and the Mafia’s hierarchical structure, I will argue that Mafia governance, if not already seen as legitimate, should now be reconsidered as such. As modern states increasingly adopt business-like approaches to governance, the Mafia’s strategies bear closer resemblance to state-building than ever before. The concluding argument will include a critical reflection on the United Nations’ differing strategies for addressing organised crime versus state corruption and propose ways forward in confronting the Mafia as a governing entity.

To begin, the Cosa Nostra rose to prominence in 19th-century Sicily amid profound social, political, and economic upheaval. Scholars provide differing perspectives on the Mafia’s infiltration of Sicilian society. As Slade (2015, p. 430) notes, “Some emphasise the use of hierarchical structures with clear bosses, while others focus on the systematic use of corruption and clientele links with state agents.” However, I argue that the Mafia’s emergence and entrenchment in Sicily cannot be attributed to a single factor; instead, it was a multifaceted process, involving both hierarchical organisation and the strategic exploitation of corruption, all underpinned by the historical context of the time. Key to understanding the Cosa Nostras rise were the weakening of Bourbon rule, the erosion of feudal structures, and the island’s shift toward capitalism.

Under Bourbon rule, Sicily was treated as a peripheral province, neglected by its rulers in Naples. Despite attempts at centralised governance, the administration was ineffective, unable to exert meaningful control across the island. Substantial portions of the countryside were left vulnerable to banditry and local disputes, creating a power vacuum that the Cosa Nostra was quick to exploit. In this environment of weak state authority, the Mafia began to organise as an extralegal entity, providing protection and resolving conflicts in exchange for loyalty and payment. As Varese (2010, p. 17) suggests, they “controlled the supply of protection,” positioning themselves as an alternative source of power, working in a delicate equilibrium with the state, which struggled to maintain order. Additionally, the abolition of primogeniture- where estates were passed intact to the eldest son- further disrupted the traditional feudal system. The fragmentation of landownership gave rise to a new class of landowners, many of whom lacked the resources or power to safeguard their property. The Cosa Nostra capitalised on this shift, stepping in as brokers and enforcers. In doing so, they proved themselves as vital intermediaries in Sicilian society, forging connections with both the land-owning elite and the rural population. While the public rhetoric of the Mafia is often associated with violence and corruption, it is essential to acknowledge the role that reputation and social inclusion played in their power. Boettke (2005) asserts that these mechanisms, deeply embedded in Sicilian culture, allowed the Cosa Nostra to maintain influence. As Bezlov and Gounev (2012) note, the Mafia’s power is rooted in its understanding of local culture and territorial affiliations, which encompass all facets of the resident social community.

Building upon this, the economic transition from feudalism to capitalism further fuelled the Cosa Nostras growth. As Sicily integrated more fully into a capitalist economy, the demand for private protection services again increased. Gambetta (1993) posits that mafias emerge when the state is ill-equipped to handle the demands of a capitalist society, thus creating a void that organised crime groups can exploit. Hill (2003) counters this by suggesting that mafias will arise regardless of state willingness to protect. Either way, the rise of capitalism saw landowners requiring agents to manage estates, collect rents, and settle disputes. The Cosa Nostra responded by organising itself into a structured hierarchy. Paoli (2020, p. 144) explains that each Mafia family is headed by a boss, elected annually, with an underboss chosen at the discretion of the boss, and counsellors elected by family members. This rigid organisational structure allowed the Cosa Nostra to monopolise industries, such as citrus production, which became a significant export commodity. Franchetti (1876) argues that the abolition of feudalism did not reduce private violence but instead made it more pervasive and democratic. With Sicily’s newfound wealth from agricultural products like citrus and sulphur, the island fell under what Van der Ploeg (2011) describes as the ‘curse of natural resources’, where the Costa Nostra controlled access to land, labour, and markets, further embedding themselves in the local economy and social fabric.

Drawing upon multidimensional criminal behavioural models we are able to understand the complexity behind the extralegal services that underpin the Cosa Nostras. Usher (1989) presents a three-class analytical framework that categorises rulers, farmers, and bandits as the key societal groups. His model highlights the interplay between these populations, with the growth of the peasant class influenced by economic conditions and the level of banditry. According to Usher, the system oscillates between phases of anarchy and despotism, with rulers in control during despotism, while bandits thrive during times of instability. Feichtinger and Novak (1994) offer a similar three-class model, but use a game-theoretic approach, where farmers generate wealth that bandits target. The extent of the bandits’ loot depends on the wealth of the farmers and the success of the plundering efforts, creating a stable cycle of shifting dominance between the bandits and rulers. Expanding on this, Feichtinger et al. (1996) proposes a predator-prey model consisting of distinct groups: rulers, soldiers, and farmers, where farmers are the prey, and soldiers protect them from the bandits, maintaining a balance of power through taxes. However, Saeed and Pavlov’s (2008) simulation feedback model provide a more layered understanding of extralegal behaviour. In this model, farmers generate bandits who prey on them, while soldiers protect the farmers, with bandits and soldiers recruited from the farming population. Bandits can return to farming, and soldiers retire when fewer are needed. This feedback loop demonstrates how the Mafia infiltrates different layers of society, particularly since the abolition of primogeniture, and highlights the interdependence of these groups. Saeed and Pavlov’s model is particularly useful for understanding the Cosa Nostra’s complex role in Sicilian society, revealing how power and resources are continually negotiated and how the Cosa Nostra adapts to shifting social structures.

In all, the Cosa Nostras ability to operate both within and outside the boundaries of the law was central to their success, especially during the populist uprisings of the mid-19th century. For instance, when revolutionary fervour swept across the island as peasant movements demanded land reform and greater rights; local elites and landowners found themselves increasingly threatened by these uprisings, and the Cosa Nostra capitalised on this climate of fear. They positioned themselves as defenders of the status quo, offering protection to landowners and property rights. In doing so, they operated within a ‘grey area’ of governance, engaging in what Sciarrone (2019) refers to as ‘positive-sum interactions,’ where both the Cosa Nostra and the state, though often in opposition, were able to maintain a level of cooperation. Through clandestine governance, the Cosa Nostra was able to preserve its cultural significance both among Sicilian citizens and within the broader Italian political landscape. By the end of the 19th century, the Cosa Nostra had firmly entrenched itself in Sicilian society. Their power was not simply the result of lawlessness, but rather a strategic adaptation to a changing socio-political environment. The combination of a fragmented state, economic transformation, and social unrest allowed the Cosa Nostra to position itself as an indispensable force, blurring the lines between criminality and governance. Paoli (2020, p. 144) names seven defining characteristics of Mafia groups, including longstanding consortia, ruling bodies, cultural apparatus, political domination, and power-sharing, all of which became central features of the Cosa Nostra operation. This history of opportunistic adaptation, which allowed the Mafia to function in a multifaceted manner, was a defining characteristic of the Cosa Nostra, facilitating its survival and evolution into the modern Mafia that persists today.

Despite this, the governance established by the Cosa Nostra is widely regarded as fundamentally corrupt, shaping how scholars have reflected on its operations. There is a general consensus that their governance arose as a direct response to environmental disturbances, as previously discussed. Slade (2015, p. 430) argues that “it was in the context of low interest in weak state protection, increasing economic transactions, and class tensions” that the Cosa Nostra was able to emerge. However, this does not mean academics have dismissed the ways in which the Cosa Nostra governed. Instead, the focus has been on why this governance is considered illegitimate and specifically categorised as criminal governance. A century after the Cosa Nostra’s rise, renowned criminologist Donald Cressey (1969, p. 327) described the organisation as “an expansionist rational bureaucracy.” In this context, Cressey suggests that, while criminal in nature, the Cosa Nostra functions much like a corporation or government institution. It combines strategic management with an unrelenting focus on growth, systematically expanding its operations and influence. This notion of rational bureaucracy, applied to a criminal organisation, provides a foundation for further theoretical exploration. The next two theories on criminal governance build upon this concept, situating their arguments within this framework of expansion and organisation.

First, we examine the work of Lessing (2021), who provides a foundational framework for understanding the characteristics of criminal governance. Lessing defines criminal governance as “the imposition of rules or restrictions on behaviour by a criminal organisation” (Lessing, 2021, p. 861). She conceptualises governance as the establishment of rules or codes by an organised regime, which shape the daily lives and routines of those under its authority. Although criminal governance may resemble legitimate governance in some respects, Lessing emphasises its critical distinction as a diminished subtype of rebel governance; consequently, it lacks legitimacy (a theme that will be explored further). Through this lens, we can better reflect on the governance imposed by the Cosa Nostra on Sicilian citizens, situating their authority within the broader theories of criminal governance.

Lessing identifies four key areas where criminal governance typically operates, each with implications for Sicilian society and Cosa Nostra behaviour. Firstly, criminal organisations act as governance providers by offering services such as security, local infrastructure, and welfare. This includes enforcing rules and resolving disputes, particularly in contexts like the Cosa Nostra’s control over farmers and banditry. Secondly, Lessing highlights the blend of legitimacy and coercion used to regulate illicit markets. She argues that successful criminal governance relies on both violence and local community support; traits for which the Cosa Nostra was well-known. Legitimacy, in this context, often stems from a perceived need to protect communities, even from other corrupt organisations, including the state. This dynamic is further elaborated through her discussion of competition and collaboration with state entities. For instance, it is ‘well-documented that the Cosa Nostra infiltrated the state to a significant degree,’ influencing elections and embedding themselves within political systems (Alesina et al., 2019, p. 463). Clandestine governance, a hallmark of the Cosa Nostra, is crucial to their continued survival and relevance. Lessing notes that criminal governance fosters dependency within communities, offering short-term order while undermining the long-term capacity of the state. This creates a cyclical dynamic of violence driven by fear and the perceived benefits of criminal governance. To qualify as criminal governance, Lessing argues, certain functions must be present, including policing and enforcement, judicial functions, fiscal mechanisms, regulatory processes, and political interference. She further asserts that ‘criminal governance flourishes in pockets of low state presence but one states can generally enter at will, if not always without violence. It thus differs from state, corporate, and rebel governance because it is embedded within larger domains of state power’ (Lessing, 2021, p. 857). In this framework, the Cosa Nostra emerges as a governing body operating under an illegitimate subtype of governance. However, as Tullock (1972) reminds us, we should not assume the existence of functional, state-based institutions when analysing such dynamics. Rather, the rise of criminal governance often reflects systemic state weaknesses that criminal organisations exploit and embed themselves within. This perspective underscores the complex interplay between criminal and state structures in the governance of societies like Sicily, which will now be interpreted through Oslons stationary bandit theory (2000).

Within Olson’s seminal work, Power and Prosperity (2000), he explores two contrasting types of ‘bandits’ to explain the emergence of stable governance and its relationship with economic development: ‘roving bandits’ and ‘stationary bandits’. I aim to utilise Olson’s theory of stationary bandits to exemplify academic perspectives on mafia-like groups that govern but lack legitimacy. Olson defines stationary bandits as rulers or elites who monopolise power and extract wealth through taxation while maintaining a vested interest in the long-term prosperity of their domain. Unlike roving bandits, who plunder indiscriminately, stationary bandits benefit from establishing order, protecting property rights, and fostering economic growth. Over time, such rulers may create systems resembling governance, forming the foundations of a state. However, Olson argues that despite their contributions to stability and growth, stationary bandits operate through an illegitimate mode of governance due to the entrenched corruption. Although, Olson further suggests that their governance is not purely coercive but often built on a symbiotic relationship between the rulers and the citizens, highlighting an evolving dynamic of mutual benefit. This multidimensional evaluation underscores the need for interdisciplinary and multi-method approaches in the study of criminal governance and corruption, schools of thought that ironically, rarely cross paths. Olson’s theory showcases that, while illegitimate in origin, such governance can develop into functioning governing bodies. This inviting further reflection on how corruption is defined and why it inherently undermines legitimacy. If we adopt the stance that any criminal behaviour within an organisation renders its governance illegitimate, scholars should also scrutinise the ‘rising levels of urban poverty… and deteriorating social infrastructure’ (Clegg & Usmani, 2019, p. 18) resulting from corruption within ostensibly legitimate states.

As we delve into the latter part of this case study, it is essential to acknowledge that the behaviours exhibited by the Cosa Nostra are undeniably corrupt, however, I propose that their governance, in many cases, provided resources and services comparable to, if not exceeding, those offered by states traditionally regarded as legitimate. By labelling their governance as entirely illegitimate, are we dismissing the significant impact they have had on Sicily, southern Italy, and even across the Atlantic in New York? While the Cosa Nostra is undoubtedly an organised crime group, does that inherently preclude them from offering a legitimate form of governance? There are multiple characteristics within the Sicilian case study that reflect an attempt to establish a democratic system, providing judicial justice, welfare, and economic stability. The Cosa Nostra’s structure is inherently organised and multifaceted, as demonstrated by their ability to “incorporate various nodes… providing governance services either separately or jointly” (Bussell, 2017, p.n/a). Thus, drawing on theoretical frameworks, empirical evidence, and global dynamics; this part of the case study seeks to explore the possibility that there may be elements of legitimacy within the way the Cosa Nostra governs, despite their criminal nature.

To begin, I draw upon the work of Aziani (2020), who conducted an empirical investigation into archetypical criminal organisations, specifically addressing security governance in territorial contexts. The study seeks to determine whether organised crime groups protect those under their rule from ordinary criminal behaviour and to understand the incentives behind such actions. Aziani’s hypothesis suggests that ‘mafias are both capable of and willing to reduce the occurrence of ordinary crimes in the areas in which they operate’ (Aziani, 2020, p.457). Most of the existing literature, including Gambetta’s (1993) protection theory, indicates that mafia groups offer protection primarily to secure trust among civilians. Gambetta argues that these motivations are rooted in self-interest, aiming to sustain stable economic transactions and preserve the status quo. However, Aziani (2020) posits that these actions may go beyond mere self-interest. Drawing on Suttles’ (1972) defended neighbourhood theory, Aziani highlights that the protection from ordinary crimes forms part of a dynamic mode of security governance. By reducing and controlling crime, mafia organisations can compete directly with the state, encompassing official law enforcement agencies. This competition not only reinforces national distrust in the state but also positions mafia groups as governing bodies capable of operating in areas where the state struggles to assert authority. Although criminologist Lessing disagrees with the notion that mafia governance is legitimate, she acknowledges that they “can bring order” and that “criminal governance may become increasingly important to social stability and contribute, however perversely, to state-building itself” (Lessing, 2020, p.856). At what point, then, should scholars consider that if something walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it may, in fact, be a duck?

This is further shown within the global state initiative of democratic participation network theory; an Innovation Helix model that encourages states to engage with relational dynamics. According to the Social Network Analysis (SNA) it attempts to improve local development policies in the age of discontent. Through a democratic process it aims to harness partnerships between civil society, public and private institutions like, Government, universities, and local businesses. The SNA states it is the basis for modern state building initiatives for a more stable economy. This is due to the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework and how local communities when they govern themselves tends to produce better outcomes (Feiock, 2013). They say working collaboratively rather than individually reduces barriers and is advantageous to projects when they are considered jointly rather than independently. It is here I want to reflect on the organisation and structure of the Cosa Nostras in Sicily. I believe the same initiatives within the innovation helix model can also be   indirectly found within the Cosa Nostra and how they have governed. This includes but not limited to the working amongst businessmen, political influences, control over institutions, democratically elected members and a participatory aspect to Sicilian living. All of which have all been implemented by the Cosa Nostras for the same reason, economic development and better living conditions. These double standards become the premise of the illegitimate versus legitmate argument. For example, ‘when mafias instrumentalize states or social movements this is called corruption. But when states or social movements instrumentalize mafias, this is called patriotism’ (Mandić, 2022 p.58) This perspective illogically stands in contrast to the classic nationalist view, which asserts that access to power, resources, and social goods begins with the recognition of both individuals and collectives as equals within a political community. Such a community is defined by its shared historical origins and cultural identity within a specific territorial boundary (Smith, 1991).

The parallels between modern state-building initiatives and how the Cosa Nostra governed over a century ago suggest that their governance had positive aspects and merits deeper consideration. Perhaps we should not automatically dismiss it as entirely illegitimate, as it demonstrates facets of governance that were adaptive, community-focused, and effective within its historical context.

I now wish to explore the argument of why historians, international relation scholars and development experts refer to mafia states as a ‘legitimate’ under the school of corruption, but criminologists dismiss any type of legitimate state building within Sicily. For instance, criminologists tend to refer to primitive states when reflecting on organised crime groups that control a populated area (Skaperdas & Syropoulos, 1997). The idea of expected warfare and that, rather than state-building it is ‘gang-building’ towards a less coercive mode of rule. Similarly, they reject the idea of a rebel state in Sicily and organised crime framework due to rebel states overarching goal of state-building. Literature dictates that rebels extract rent for different motivations to organised crime groups; they engage in activities with intention of taking over the state and then reforming. According to Weinstein (2006) organised crime groups often govern without state aims, political ideologies and or strong territorial control. Whilst they do consider its not as simple as one is a form of state and the other is not, they only go as far to say it allows a symbiotic relationship. I believe the narrative may be different if the Italian government had taken sufficient action to penetrate and dismantle the Cosa Nostra during their prime, instead they were left to rule and govern not needing to take over the larger state because of political infiltration. De Facto, the Cosa Nostras had state building aims including a taxation process, central to governance; in fact, many scholars treat taxation as a proxy, ‘the next best thing to a perfect barometer of state power’ (Slater, 2010 p.35), this appears to be disregarded when analysing Cosa Nostra governance.

To add, even with the Italian state remaining present within the larger region, theoretical models suggest Sicily could be seen as a sub-type of a mafia state including sub-type one and sub-type three, hybrid. Sub-type one is referring to states with organised crime groups, often heavily engaged with each other. The political regime tends to be authoritarian, oppressing opposition with violence. Institutions may be abolished, reformed or replaced, and coercive forces of the state are aligned with and benefit from mafia activities. The organised criminal groups are also granted authority to operate illegal activities in exchange for maintaining public order in specific areas, i.e Sicily. The states' ability in these cases tend to be weak, failing to provide public goods or not keeping up with the expectations of the market. Furthermore, the argument can be made that Sicily has been under the control of sub-type three, a hybrid state formation. This is where the state is somewhat engaged with organised crime groups. The regime is also authoritarian, weakening the opposition to ensure they cannot win elections. Institutions are subservient to the regime and coercive forces may benefit materially from some mafia activities. The state allows certain criminal groups to operate illicit businesses and uses them as proxies in specific situations, and vice versa. The state is likely to deliver expected public goods despite its engagement with organised crime. Therefore, the Cosa Nostra respectively deserves recognition for their contribution towards two legitimate modes of states Sicily has been governed under.

A theoretical underpinning may help allude to the complexity between state building and corruption. Gambetta (1993 p.77) argued for ‘seeing mafias as an alternative governance providers, trying as states do to monopolise the sale of protection over a given territory’. Theorists such as Weber and Tilly further attempt to explain why this should be the case. That often we label forces of corruption neglecting the coercive powers of states themselves. Weber (1946) defines states as a monopoly of legitimate force over a given territory, and in a Weberian stance that includes inherent corruption and coercive apparatus. He discusses the idea of legitimacy and authority but explains how this can be seen through different forms; traditional authority, charismatic authority, and rational-legal authority. Weber outlines that authority is the foundational base to legitimacy. Cosa Nostras can be viewed to have charismatic authority, legitimacy built on personal qualities and a vision of a leader. As was the case in Sicily, Weber further explains the historical processes behind state building and that the process appeared in Europe through the consolidation of power over territory. Political science has yet to adequately grapple with this reality, shown through the debates and contradictions between the Italian government and the Cosa Nostra. However, someone who attempts to make the link, is Charles Tilly (2000) within his work ‘war making and state making as organised crime’. Tilly notes mafias operate in ways similar to states, with the key distinction being one of scale and legitimacy. Like states, they regulate and control the production and distribution of commodities or services. Their power often arises from the state’s failure to maintain its monopoly on coercion, allowing mafias to fill the vacuum and to compete. Tilly further explains the development of modern nation-states can, in fact, be understood through the lens of organised crime. Including the work of Weber and other theorists, Tilly has drawn provocative analogies between state formation and the activities of protection rackets, suggesting that states, like mafias, offer protection against threats they may have themselves created. Thus, there is both the argument for and against on the legitimacy of Cosa Nostra governance. Within criminology there is the consensus the criminal activities disregard any positive legitmate aspect of their rule, while amongst development scholars and philosophers suggests a more complex approach. Whether or not you view the Cosa Nostras as a legitimate mode of governance depends on, one how you interpret their criminal motivations and two, how you view states themselves, leaving a gap in the literature and room for interpretation.

The legitimacy of the Cosa Nostra as a mode of governance remains a subject of debate, but it is essential to examine how it has evolved into global mafia networks. In light of neoliberalism and urbanisation reshaping state governance, even if scholars have historically dismissed its legitimacy, it is now more important than ever to critically reevaluate its role and influence. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the global financial landscape has undergone a profound transformation. What was once a Fordist, commodity-based economy has shifted towards an over-financialised, indebted model (Lazzarato, 2011). The global order now rests precariously on fiat currency and the emergence of a post-capitalist society (Mason, 2015), which has redefined the role of the state. Banks and governments have become increasingly interdependent, a relationship solidified by the 2008 financial crash. The mass bailouts provided to financial institutions, combined with neoliberal policies such as austerity, have intertwined economic and social systems. Neoliberalism has fundamentally altered perceptions of money, transforming states into businesses and citizens into entrepreneurs. In this context, it becomes vital to reconsider the modern impact of mafia-like groups and their continued influence over governance, particularly in a global climate that allows such groups to exploit gaps in security and authority. As licit markets have expanded and become deregulated, so too have illicit ones. For instance, there are more than two billion informal workers in the global economy, accounting for approximately half of the global workforce (Hummel, 2021). Mafia organisations increasingly operate as entrepreneurial entities, seeking business opportunities, developing strategies, and maximising profits- not necessarily limited to illicit markets, though even within illicit markets, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has consistently recognised their economic impact (James, 2012). Drawing on the work of Faldetta and Provenzano (2016), which examines criminal business models, it is clear that mafia groups have structured and organised themselves in ways that align with neoliberal governance. This alignment places the question of their legitimacy as governing entities at the forefront of contemporary societal debates.

 In their study ‘Criminal Business Model and the Governance of Seized and Confiscated Businesses’ (Faldetta & Provenzano, 2016), the authors examine the transformation of business models when governance intersects with criminal activity on a transnational level. Business models are defined as the ways in which organisations connect with others to facilitate transactions and generate profit (Amit & Zott, 2001). These models have been a central focus in economic management research, with criminal business models offering insights into governance structures and how they adapt over time. For instance, Faldetta and Provenzano (2016) describe the Cosa Nostra as a ‘state within a state,’ a tightly woven social network rooted in reciprocal relationships. This network fosters a sense of security among economic agents, reduces uncertainty, and manages opportunism through guarantees and mutual trust (Faldetta & Provenzano, 2016, p. 48). This conceptualisation aligns with the work of Abadinsky (1997), who refers to mafia groups as enterprises. This notion of mafias as efficient business entities has been extensively explored within economics. Schelling (1971), for example, was among the first economists to describe mafia groups as ‘large-scale, continuing firms’ that actively seek to control markets. Leeson and Rogers (2012) extend this analysis by highlighting the hierarchical structure of the Sicilian mafia, which has contributed to its economic success. There has also been an emphasis of the governance mechanisms of these hierarchies, with scholars such as Reuter (1998), Abadinsky (1997), and Turvani (1997) proposing theoretical frameworks to understand the management of criminal transactions. Dick (1995) offers a transaction cost-based theory of organised crime, positioning criminal organisations as formal governance structures that specialise in delivering illegal goods and services. Williamson (1985) takes a complementary approach, focusing on how hierarchical structures in mafia organisations economise on transaction costs by addressing issues such as bounded rationality, opportunism, and asset specificity. The Cosa Nostra exemplifies governance that capitalises on bounded rationality in interpersonal relationships, a feature that has been praised within management studies for its problem-solving efficiency within hierarchical systems. It is crucial to note, these analyses often adopt static perspectives that overlook the dynamic and corrupt nature of mafia networks. Despite this limitation, economists have consistently commended the mafia’s ability to conduct efficient business operations, particularly in terms of structure and governance. By utilising Skaperdas work on the mafia and game theory (2001) we are able to understand that the business side of mafia organisations are multifaceted and well-rounded. That each tactic is well thought out and effective including but not limited to conflict and resource allocation, efficient versus destructive competition, endogenous rules and institutions, power and bargaining and applications in economics and politics. Thus, in the context of neoliberalism and an increasingly urbanised society, the governance of fiscal and economic issues is more crucial than ever. Literature suggests that the mafia’s success in structuring and managing its business models positions it as an increasingly sophisticated governing body. As the lines between legal and illegal markets blur, mafia groups like the Cosa Nostra continue to adapt, leveraging their entrepreneurial strategies to assert influence in ways that resemble legitimate governance structures more closely than ever before.

On a last point, we will briefly examine the United Nations (UN) strategies for organised crime and interstate corruption. The UN has established initiatives to address both of these counterparts and among these efforts are specialised subgroups such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC). These entities provide frameworks for international cooperation to combat organised crime through measures like criminalising specific offences, facilitating extradition agreements, and offering mutual legal assistance. Their strategic vision emphasises strengthening law enforcement efforts against illicit trade and corruption. Additionally, the UN supports less developed countries by offering training and technical aid to enhance their capacity to tackle organised crime, aligning these efforts with Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG 16), human rights, and gender equality. The issue arises, when a brief examination of the UN’s initiatives for addressing corruption within state governance, portrays a less robust approach. Like their approach to organised crime, the UN has created the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Yet, many of these measures are preventive, focusing on anti-corruption bodies and whistleblower protections. While efforts such as asset recovery and global initiatives have shown promise, their impact is often limited. The UN has achieved operational success through UNTOC in combating human trafficking and dismantling smaller organised crime groups. Nevertheless, mafia organisations remain entrenched in society. This persistence can be attributed, in part, to high levels of corruption and the role of criminal governance. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) highlights a strong correlation between higher corruption levels and weaker rule of law. To reduce mafia influence, it is essential to understand how governance operates within these groups. Unlike organised crime alone, corruption is a systemic issue requiring long-term societal and institutional changes. Such changes are difficult to measure or achieve quickly, which may explain why mafia groups, particularly those affiliated with the Cosa Nostra, continue to wield significant power and governance. Organised crime is not diminishing; rather, it is adapting to global changes and exploiting emerging vulnerabilities. Effective countermeasures must prioritise international cooperation while addressing root causes such as corruption and the weakening of state authority. Without a comprehensive approach, the evolving strategies of mafia groups will continue to undermine global efforts to combat organised crime.

To conclude, the Cosa Nostra has historically provided a multidimensional mode of governance on the island of Sicily. Through historical adaptations, they were able to informally govern the region via kinship networks and mutual understanding. They adapted to capitalist frameworks and monopolised protection, ultimately leading to extralegal governance. This evolution gave rise to criminal governance theories, which often label mafia governance as illegitimate due to its association with high levels of corruption and criminal activity. However, at what point should scholars recognise the potential positive aspects of mafia governance, or at least draw parallels to state initiatives? By adopting an interdisciplinary approach to the debate over illegitimate versus legitimate governance, we can draw on theories and empirical studies from both sides of the argument. If we view the Cosa Nostra solely as an organised crime group, we must apply the same logic to state governments that are infiltrated with criminal activity. This parallel is often absent in criminological discourse, which suggests that we might need to reconsider mafia governance as legitimate in certain contexts. I propose that we hold both the corruption and illegality, alongside the high levels of governance, in order to better address infamous organised crime groups like the Mafia. As our global markets continue to expand, it becomes increasingly important to consider all possible solutions and interpretations of criminal governance. The Cosa Nostra’s influence on Sicily persists to this day, and to categorically dismiss their governance as illegitimate would overlook an important part of Sicilian culture. Moving forward, criminologists should collaborate more closely with scholars of corruption to develop a more comprehensive understanding of criminal governance.

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